Loan securitization has become a widely used method for consolidating collections of loans into financial instruments with sufficiently stable statistical properties that they can be freely traded. In recent years the concept has been generally extended, creating a class of asset backed securities, financial instruments which are created from a wide variety of loan sources, including credit card, commercial real estate and even financial investment (hedge fund) lending. In this paper the money and loan supply implications of these instruments within a fractional reserve banking system are examined. It appears that the interaction of these instruments create an infinite loop within the monetary system, which removes the limit on loan creation that should be imposed by the bank's reserve requirement. This has effectively disabled the ability of the central bank's reserve requirements to limit the expansion of credit by commercial banks, leading directly to the current credit crisis. The evidence suggests that loan securitization and the sale of commercial bank loans outside the regulated banking industry are incompatible with the stable operation of a fractional reserve banking system.
Introduction
Analysis of the causes of the current credit crisis [1] has primarily concentrated on relaxed lending standards over the last decade. Asset backed securities in particular have been extensively criticised for creating a moral hazard, whereby the sale of loans by the originating lender removed any incentive for the lender to ensure that the recipient of the loan could pay it back. In this paper however, another possibility is explored, namely that asset backed securities created a far more serious systemic problem, within the mechanisms which are supposed to regulate the quantity of loans created by the commercial banks.
Within the fractional reserve banking system, money deposited with commercial banks is used to create loans. This can result in the creation of money within the larger banking system, as the money provided as a loan is then redeposited into the banking system, whilst the original depositor also retains a claim on their deposit. To ensure that deposits can be repaid on request, and also to avoid an uncontrolled expansion of the money supply, banks are required to limit their lending to a large fraction of their deposits (typically 90%), maintaining the remaining funds as a regulated reserve. Essentially banks statistically multiplex their customers access to deposited funds using their reserve, and use the larger part of deposits to provide loans [2] . (A more detailed description of the fractional reserve lending process is provided below.)
In practice, although it is not typically described this way, the process regulating fractional reserve banking should not only limit the total creation of money by the commercial banks, but it in theory also places a similar (and slightly lower) limit on the total supply of commercial bank credit to the economy. Some regulation of the total quantity of commercial bank loans available to the economy would seem to be important, since the price of assets that are customarily purchased with loans, such as real estate, will be determined in no small part by the quantity of money their purchasers are willing, and able to borrow. There are also associated repayment implications for the larger system, in that there must be sufficient money available to honour all the debts and their associated interest payments that are being generated by the banking system. Asset backed securities have been widely praised for providing 'liquidity', by allowing banks to sell loans that would otherwise stay on their books and prevent them from generating more loans. Wolfe [3] noted that securitization allowed banks to increase their return on capital by transforming their operations into a credit generating pipeline process, but apparently didn't consider the effects of this mechanism on the larger banking system. Indeed, from the perspective of any of the individual actors within the system, being able to sell loans in order to extend more credit may not seem that unreasonable. Any single request for credit, whether to buy a house, finance a car, or buy stock for a business can be a sound business proposition, and a bank approached for such a loan, may well judge it unreasonable to be unable to make such a loan simply because they have already reached the limit of lending dictated by their reserves.
The problem this creates though, occurs at the system level in the regulation of debt to the entire economy. Purely mathematically, there is a limit on the amount of debt and associated interest payments that can be supported by the available banking deposits. Additionally any increase in the supply of loans to the economy can be no different in principle to an increase in the general supply of money, in terms of the eventual effect on the prices of assets that can be purchased with loans. As the amount of credit being extended increases, all other things being equal, so does the price of items that are primarily purchased with credit, such as houses and commercial real estate. The situation becomes further complicated, if financial instruments can be created out of loans, which are then traded, and in some cases can even be used to act as collateral for further loans.
Without regulation of the total quantity of loans being made available, there is no way to prevent the system reaching a threshold point where total loan and interest payments exceed the ability of the system to support them.
The particular problem that is created by the sale of loans outside of the regulated banking system can be illustrated by a simple example. Consider two banks, as shown in Table 1 . Bank A has made loans up to the limit that its capital reserve allows. Bank B has $1000 in deposits, but has no loans outstanding.
Bank A creates an asset backed security from its loan portfolio, and sells it to the depositor at Bank B at its face value of $900, creating the situation shown in Table 2 . As Bank A now no longer has any loans outstanding it can create additional loans, up to the limit allowed by its capital reserve. The loan money issued by Bank A is re-deposited at Bank B, as shown in Table 3 .
However, the allocation of deposits and loans in the banks shown in Table 3 is identical in all respects to those shown in Table 1 , with the addition of a $900 Asset Backed Security created by the sale of the loan by bank A. Since the two states of the system are identical with respect to the ability to issue loans, Bank A can continue to create Asset Backed Securities until it is either no longer able to find willing borrowers to lend too, or investors prepared to purchase the asset backed securities it is creating. A  1000  900  100  B  1000  0  100 Bank A, creates an Asset Backed Security from its loan portfolio, and sells it to the depositor at Bank B, creating the situation shown in Table 2 . Table 2 : Bank Deposits Loans Outstanding Capital Reserve A 1000 0 100 B 100 0 100 Σ ABS = $900 Bank A now creates another loan which is again deposited with Bank B, as shown in Table 3   Table 3:  Bank  Deposits Loans Outstanding Capital Reserve  A  1000  900  100  B  1000  0  100  Σ ABS = $900 Bank A, again sells the loan to the depositor at Bank B as shown in Table 4 . Notice that outside the increase in the total amount of Asset Backed Securities there is no other change from Table 2 .
The "pipeline" that Asset Backed Securities then create for the banks generating them, is perhaps better described as a trigger for an infinite loop in the rules governing the supply of commercial bank credit. As long as the bank can find borrowers to lend too, and purchasers of the Asset Backed Securities, it can continue to issue credit, profiting from the fees charged to both A  1000  0  100  B  100  0  100  Σ ABS = $1800 borrowers and purchasers. The only systemic limit on the quantity of loans issued is the number of qualified borrowers, and the availability of purchasers for the loan. Unfortunately, the combination of both supply and demand impacts on the rest of the financial apparatus have made the results of exploiting this mechanism far reaching.
There are two critical differences between arbitrary increases in the money supply, and the loan supply: loans do not have to be paid back, and loans can have durations from days to decades. Consequently the effects of unregulated increases in the loan supply take longer to manifest themselves than those of rapid increases in the physical money supply. They also include both inflationary and deflationery effects, as money is first injected into the financial system by the production of loans, and then destroyed when eventually the excess of loans cannot be supported by the remaining non-loan encumbered money supply and they go into default.
This problem and its ramifications will be examined in more detail in the rest of the paper. In the main, analysis will concentrate on the banking system in the United States, partly because of the extraordinary size of the credit bubble in that country, but also because of the public availability of financial statistics for that economy. It is not believed that there is any substantial difference in the operation of the mechanisms described here for any country whose banking system is based on fractional reserve banking, and which has been allowed to engage in the production and sale of significant quantities of commercial bank loans.
Interactions between the Money and Loan Supplies
Although the concept of money supply is relatively clear, the precise quantification of the amount of money in its various forms, that is available to the economy is somewhat problematic, and several published measures are used to do this. What is regarded as money in the current financial system, is primarily held as entries in computerised databases, and has consequently become somewhat divorced from the physical notes and coins that are still issued as tangible vouchers of exchange. In the USA for example, the total of the physical currency and the balances of current accounts held by banks and savings institutions is defined as the M1 money supply measure. It and the M2 measure which additionally includes longer term savings accounts and money market funds have been steadily increasing over the last decades, as shown in Figure 2 (a). It is noticeable that the rate of increase of M2 has been markedly faster than that of M1 over the last 3 decades, which is suggestive of problems peculiar to the regulation of the non-physical money supply.
The precise cause of this growth in M2, and an even larger corresponding growth in the USA's M3 measure, until reporting was discontinued in 2006, has gone unexplained. Economic analysis of M2 seems to concentrate on its role as an economic indicator, and there has been some comment on its declining usefulness for this purpose. Research by the Federal Reserve [4] , indicates that forecasts for M2 have broken down -possibly because the models were not predicting the excessive growth shown. Over the same period however, other economic indicators were extremely favourable, and had also shown a marked decrease in their variability, leading to references to the "Great Moderation", as a descriptive for the period [5] . In the presence of a very rapid drop in communications latency caused by the introduction of widespread data and phone networking, with consequent and equally dramatic increases in productivity, it seems to have gone unremarked that actual macro-economic conditions were exceptionally deflationary, had all other things in fact been equal. The deflationary forces on the economy are most noticeable when the price drops of computers and data transmission during this time are considered. Considering the notion of money as a simple token of exchange, it is clear that variations in its quantity, against a constant supply of what it is buying, will cause the expansion and contraction of prices. Hence Milton Friedman's statement that "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon." In today's economy though, the majority of what is termed money, be it M1, M2 or M3 measures, is not physical. Rather it exists as carefully audited electronic entries in banking accounts, and in the form of a wide variety of financial instruments. The majority of money transfers are also not physical, they are carried out electronically from account to account.
The M2 measure of money is made up of a number of components as shown in Figure 2 (b). From this it can be seen that its rapid growth has been disproportionately concentrated in Institutional Money Funds, and long term bank deposits. Growth in long term bank deposits represents direct expansion of the electronic money supply as measured by M2 and M3, as does growth in institutional money funds. Money market funds, are generally represented as extremely safe investments -their rapid growth, raises the question of what instruments are being purchased for this purpose, since inevitably there is a somewhat limited supply of safe investments that would meet their criteria. From the 1990's onwards, one of these investments appears to have been some forms of asset backed securities, represented as safe investments through the purchase of default insurance.
Is a loan money? A loan is typically an agreement to repay a sum of money, plus a periodic interest payment. A treasury certificate is a loan to the United States government, and is regarded as a safe investment. There is no reason it can not be used as settlement for a transaction, and it often is. Much of the proliferation of exotic financial instruments in recent years, has arisen from the repackaging and securitization of loans made by the commercial banks.
A municipal bond, backed by bond insurance, is at least in theory a a financial instrument with no associated loss risk -since in the event of default the insurance payment then covers the capital loss. The extension of such insurance to asset backed securities helped in making them equally attractive as financial instruments, and assisted in the widespread sale of these instruments. Thus they were a guaranteed, high return financial instrument, up until the point where a series of defaults on the loans within the instruments exposed the inadequacy of the underlying insurance provision.
If some degree of stability in the money supply is regarded as important, should variations in the supply of loans also be of concern? Considering the quantitative problem, it can be argued that increases in the loan supply, in the presence of a restricted supply of goods, have the same effect on prices that increases in the money supply do. Namely, inflation in the prices of the goods concerned, and a potential misallocation of resources into increasing their supply. This has been evident in particular in real estate over the the last 10 years, where easing of the availability and amounts granted for mortgages have led to rapid house price inflation, most noticeably in the coastal United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Australia, and New Zealand. Amongst others.
Loans are problematic for the financial system for other reasons than pure supply. Loans are made for relatively large amounts of money, they are usually made for fixed periods, varying from a day to decades, and they can have a varying or fixed rate of interest. The long duration of many loans is also a factor in complicating analysis. A very rapid increase in physical currency has an equally rapid effect on the price level in the economy. It is not hard to derive cause and effect. Changes in the supply of loans may be equally dramatic, but loans can have durations of years or decades, and their effect is initially localised to the area of the economy where the loans are being granted: housing, commercial real estate, student loans and even particular regions such as Tokyo or the city of New York. The eventual consequences may not be as easy to discern, but the question does remain. Is inflation, everywhere and anywhere, also a lending phenomenon? What is supposed to limit the supply of commercial bank loans to the economy?
Fractional Reserve Banking
There are several sources of loans within the economy. Individuals can lend money, this is a simple transfer of funds. Bonds can be issued by a variety of organisations from a country's government (treasuries), to small towns, and corporate entities. These are also transfers, in the sense that money is transferred to the bond issuer by the purchaser, but with the complication that some bonds, particularly government bonds from stable countries, are often regarded as money equivalents. Then there are loans generated by commercial banks regulated through the fractional reserve banking system. These are a little different.
Regulation of the money supply in a modern economy is the responsibility of the central bank, in conjunction with government policy. It is performed using a set of mechanisms that are generally referred to as the fractional reserve banking system. Although the system of fractional reserve banking is the same in all countries, there are variances in the process of how it is actually implemented, in terms of the reserve requirements, the financial instruments that can be used to hold reserves, etc. Attempts are being made to normalise these rules across country through the Basel series of treaties. The system described in this paper is in all cases that of the United States of America, which is currently based on a mixture of Basel 1 and 2 requirements.
Under fractional reserve banking procedures in the United States, banks are founded with a capital requirement. This is a sum of money, in the USA a minimum of $5 million, which must be supplied by the directors and owners of the bank. This reserve is held separately to customer deposits at the banks, and can only be held in specific financial instruments as specified by the Basel 1, and Basel 2 treaties. 1 Commercial banks are then allowed to lend out a portion of their customers deposits, but are required to maintain a specified ratio between their capital reserve, and their assets (loans.) This ratio is referred to as the capital adequacy ratio. This ratio is mandated to be no less than 8% for banks conforming to the Basel guidelines. The ratio can also be specified as the ratio of reserves to deposits, when it is termed the reserve ratio.
As money is lent by the banks, it is redeposited within the banking system. This process causes the creation of money within the system, since the deposit representing the money that has been lent out by the bank, is still present. The process of money creation this causes, is described on the New York Federal Reserve's web site 2 , as follows:
"Reserve requirements affect the potential of the banking system to create transaction deposits. If the reserve requirement is 10%, for example, a bank that receives a $100 deposit may lend out $90 of that deposit. If the borrower then writes a check to someone who deposits the $90, the bank receiving that deposit can lend out $81. As the process continues, the banking system can expand the initial deposit of $100 into a maximum of $1,000 of money ($100+$90+81+$72.90+...=$1,000). In contrast, with a 20% reserve requirement, the banking system would be able to expand the initial $100 deposit into a maximum of $500 ($100+$80+$64+$51.20+...=$500)."
The effect on the money supply of the entire system is a little clearer when the process is shown in tabular form. As loans are made by the banks, and money is created and re-deposited into the Reserve  1  1000  750  250  1000  950  50  2  750  563  188  950  903  48  3  563  422  141  903  857  45  5  422  316  105  857  815  43  6  316  237  79  815  774  41  7  237  178  59  774  735  39  8  178  133  44  735  698  37  9  133  100  33  698  663  35  10  100  75  25  663  630  33  3700  2775  925  7395  7025  370 banking system, the local limit on lending by individual banks imposed by the capital reserve also places a ceiling on the larger expansion of the money supply within the banking system. From this description several simple inferences can be drawn about the limits on loans and money creation, both from the local perspective of a bank making loans, and from the perspective of the central bank, monitoring the behaviour of the entire banking system. First, the total sum of commercial bank loans in the economy should always be less than the total amount of deposits. This follows from the requirement to keep a portion of deposits in reserve. If this is done correctly, then the amount of commercial bank loans in the economy can in fact, never exceed deposits.
Secondly the reserve requirement theoretically acts to limit expansion of the money supply, to a multiple of the money multiplier, ie.
Deposits = D/R
where R is the fractional reserve requirement, and D is the initial deposit into the system. This then, places an accompanying limit on the total quantity of loans that can be made by the banking system, which is:
For a reserve ratio of 10% then, the limit on money expansion is D/0.1 = 10 * D total deposits, and the theoretical limits on loan expansion is accordingly 9 times the total of deposits.
Exact figures for the amount of Asset Backed Securities that have been created are difficult to determine from public data. Bank reporting appears to be confined to the loans that are currently present on the bank's books, and this is reflected in the Central Bank's aggregate reporting. Loans that have been bundled into ABS pools and sold to non-bank entities do not appear to be reported. If the hypothesis advanced in this paper is correct, then any significant amount of ABS sales should create discrepancies at the macro-economic reporting level in the ratio of the total amount of loans that have been made to the monetary base, in that the ratio of loans to the monetary base should increase, as loans are generated and sold off as ABS securities. In general terms this means that the economy should experience increasing amounts of leverage. The increases in M2 and M3 shown in Figure 2 (a) support this, if it is assumed that mortgage backed securities are being purchased by Money Market funds, however this is a little circumstantial.
In general, proving this hypothesis is difficult in the absence of public information specifically on the total amount of commercial bank generated loans currently being supported by the economy, the amount still owned and represented as bank assets, and those packaged into Asset Backed Securities, that are now owned outside of the regulated banking system, and in many cases outside of the United States. Individual banks it should be observed, will always be within their regulated lending to deposit ratios, since this is a strictly regulated requirement for them to remain banks, and avoid Friday meetings with the FDIC. The problem can only be observed in macro-economic statistics.
In bank accounting, loans are treated as assets, and deposits are listed as liabilities. However, care must be taken in interpreting officially reported statistics since not all assets are loans. The total assets and liabilities for commercial banks in the United States are reported by the Federal Reserve Banks in the weekly H.8 release. This is a large and somewhat complex data set with aggregates of US Commercial Bank assets and liabilities. A simple comparison of total assets (line 23) versus liabilities (line 34) 3 shows a surplus of assets over liabilities of approximately $1.5 trillion. However, this appears to also include some part of the reserves (Securities in bank credit, line 2). Assuming that is the case, then Figure 3 (a) is showing that in today's US Banking System, the textbook fractional reserve relationship, namely that Liabilities(deposits) >= Assets(loans)+ Reserves does not hold true.
Looking in more detail, and comparing the Loans and Leases in bank credit (line 5) specifically with Deposits (lines 5 and 24 respectively, as shown in Figure 3(b) , it can be seen that the discrepancy continues to present itself.
There are two interesting features in these figures. The growth in both loans and deposits is remarkable, and appears to be independent of general inflation rates, especially as the rate of increase accelerates in the low inflation period of the 1990's and early 21st century. More critically the data also shows a divergence in the relationship between the amount loaned (assets), to the amount on deposit(liabilities). As has been suggested, the textbook explanation of the fractional reserve banking mechanism requires that the sum of commercial bank deposits exceed their loans. This relationship does not appear to be supported by the federal reserve bank H8 data series.
The amount of mortgage debt outstanding in the USA is separately reported 4 , and appears to include securitized loans. As of the end of 2008 it reports total mortgage debt of $14.6 trillion, whilst the H8 report shows liabilities of the US commercial banks as totalling $12 trillion. Report G.19 shows an additional $2.5 trillion of consumer credit. This does not include non-consumer commercial bank lending, such as commercial real estate and corporate lending, which was also subject to loan securitization.
To appreciate the implications of this anomaly between the statistics and the theoretical model, consider the underlying fractional reserve relationship. In theory, if all the loans generated through the fractional reserve banking process were instantly repaid in full, then only the original deposit into the system should remain. It would appear that today's american banking system would instead be left with upwards of $5 trillion of debt, and no deposits with which to pay it back. 5 Leaving aside the H.8 data series anomaly, the textbook explanation of the fractional reserve banking process also provides no explanation for how the assets and liabilities for the banks were able to grow to this extent. Growth is permitted within the context of the process, as shown in Table 5 , but this expansion is capped by the amount of the capital reserve. Banks may individually increase their capital reserves, from profits, by selling preferred shares, but this money should be redistributed from deposits, which in theory would cause a corresponding adjustment somewhere else in the system. For example, if Bank A as shown in Table 6 uses $100 in profits to increase its Capital Reserve, this money is removed from the deposit side at some point in the banking system. If we assume this is from the deposit at A, then this produces the situation in A1. The removal triggers a reduction in the loan amount that can be extended, since loans are restricted to a fraction of deposits. If Bank A is unable to attract deposits from other banks (which would in turn reduce their loan capability), it would be more profitable moving its reserve back to the deposit side, allowing it to increase its lending. This theoretically prevents the kind of unlimited expansion of the money supply that the fractional banking system is sometimes accused of allowing, although it might be gently observed that there is no actual evidence for this kind of monetary stability in the macro-economic statistics.
The system appears to be far less robust though, to manipulations on the loan side of the equation. As has already been seen, if loans can be transferred outside of the regulated banking system, then any limit imposed by the fractional reserve requirement on the issue of loans by the commercial banks is removed. This triggers additional issues if it is possible for loan instruments to be counted as part of the capital reserve.
If money can be moved from being classified as a loan, to the capital reserve, then it creates the following problem. In A1, a loan instrument of $100 is moved into the capital reserve. This is shown happening in one bank for clarity, but in practice it would happen as the result of interactions between the flow of financial instruments within the system, for example Bank A buys a AAA rated, insured, senior tranche of an Asset Backed Security to hold part of its capital reserve. As a result, the Bank can issue another loan of $100, since it is both within its capital reserve allowance, and its ratio of deposits to loans. The result, when the new loan is redeposited into the banking system, is a growth in both the loan supply and the money supply, as shown in A2. This appears to be one possible explanation for the unexplained growth in M2 and M3 that has been recorded.
From the purely local perspective of a bank, reserves are a problem. They represent deposits which must be maintained by the bank (with all the associated costs of account maintenance etc.). Consequently they are regarded as an inconvenient cost, rather than the critical regulator of the fractional reserve process which they in fact are. Both Basel 1 and 2 concentrate on mitigating the risk of losses, which is presented primarily as a problem of high enough quality financial instruments. The systemic importance of the reserve appears to have been partially lost sight of. Obviously if it can, a Bank will seek to invest its reserve in some form of financial instrument that pays a return to offset the costs the reserve represents in terms of account maintenance. The composition of the reserves is carefully regulated, by national law and the Basel 1 and 2 agreements, and only very high investment quality financial instruments are allowed. It does appear though, from those accords, that banks are allowed to hold a part of their reserves in high quality asset backed securities. Specifically, they can be included in Tier 2 capital, which is allowed to comprise up to 4% of the reserve.
41. Loans fully secured by mortgage on occupied residential property have a very low record of loss in most countries. The framework will recognise this by assigning a 50% weight to loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property which is rented or is (or is intended to be) occupied by the borrower. 6 As is shown in table 7 though, concentrating on the the risk of default of any given loan instrument ignores the much larger problem of creating a positive feedback loop within the regulation of the money supply, by allowing the movement of loan instruments into the bank's capital reserves.
Reserve Regulation
Reserve regulation by the central banks is an important part of the monetary system, and in theory a key regulator of its behaviour. The available evidence suggests that regulation of the physical currency is more or less successful. (Although there is probably some feedback occurring from the electronic side.)
The process of reserve regulation in the United States is as follows. Banks are required to keep part of their reserves on deposit at the Federal Reserve, the required reserve ratio. This is not their entire reserve, only that which is allocated to physical cash and checking accounts. The amount of reserve that has to be held at the Federal Reserve Banks has changed over the years, as documented by Feinman [6] , but is currently 10% on transaction (checking) accounts and vault cash, and 0% on all others. Reporting of the reserve amounts is provided by Federal Reserve Statistical release H.3, Aggregate Reserves of Depositary Institutions and the Monetary Base 7 . The monetary base is the total of physical currency (notes and coins), and the commercial banks' reserves at the central banks.
In Figure 4 (a) the ratio of the total bank reserves held at the Federal Reserve Banks is shown to respectively the Monetary Base and M1, M2 and M3 for the period 1959 to 2007. This shows the relative growth in the various measures over those years, as well as the different rates of growth these various measures of the total money supply have exhibited, which is possibly more revealing. 8 It is very clear from the figure, that the growth behaviour of the narrower measures of money supply has been markedly different from the wider M2, M3 measures.
To clarify, as a comparison the growth in assets (loans), liabilities (deposits), and reserves (equity capital), for a single US bank, Citi is shown in Figure 4(b) . From this figure, it appears that the total equity capital reserves for Citibank at the end of 2007 of $99 billion, exceeded the then monetary base for the entire american banking system. The data is taken from Call Reports filed by the bank with the FDIC since 2001. The chart shows a microcosm of the growth in the entire banking system that was illustrated in Figure 4(a) .
If the reserve regulation mechanisms are working properly, then banking is essentially a zero sum game, conducted within a flexible, but ultimately constrained system. Fractional reserve banking allows a certain amount of expansion and contraction in the amount of loans and money available to the economy, but this should occur within the proscribed limits of the central bank's control of the reserves. Unfortunately, there is no evidence for this form of the process in the behaviour of the electronic money supply in these figures. Rather the continuous, and near exponential growth being shown suggests that the reserve limits are being circumvented in some fashion, and money or money equivalents are being incorrectly generated within the system.
Debt Cascades
One further feature of the fractional reserve system should be mentioned, if only to explain some of the economic side effects that typically accompany credit bubbles. The bank's reserves do not serve the sole purpose of regulating the expansion of the money and loan supplies. They are also there to cover losses. Specifically, if sufficiently high loan defaults occur, which cannot be met from profits, then the capital reserve is used to cover them. Unfortunately, this immediately has implications for Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was founded in 1938 to purchase and securitize mortgages as part of depression era measures. the loan supply, since banks are strictly regulated on their reserve ratios to liabilities and assets.
The result then of any significant debt failure that cannot be covered by profits is an immediate contraction in the supply of loans, as the size of the reserve is reduced. If banks can recall loans they will do so, they will also cease granting new ones, and this quickly has a progressive effect on the economy where many companies and individuals depend on revolving loans. As loans are no longer renewed, more companies fall into default, the capital reserves of the banks are further impaired, and the money and loan supplies contract further. This process was originally described by Fisher [7] in the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash, which also appears to have been triggered by a rapid loan inflation, caused by the use of margin loans to purchase stock, which created a positive feedback loop in stock prices.
This points to intrinsic instabilities in the fractional reserve banking system itself. Leaving aside the problems created by failures in regulatory processes, there is always the danger that the economy itself could generate a large enough loan default to trigger a cascade. Taleb's 'Black Swan' events [8] , may be neither rare nor unusual, but rather expected, periodic outcomes, driven by self-generating loan cycles.
Conclusion
Failure in loan regulation appears to be implicated in most if not all major financial crises. Furman and Stiglitz drew attention to the problem of high levels of short term debt in conjunction with the East Asian crisis of the late 1990's. [9] Property loans were heavily involved in the Japanese bubble in the 1980's, and margin loans in the 1929 american stock market crash. In both cases loans were being used to purchase items in limited supply, whose price could then be used as collateral for further loans. It would appear that rational speculation on rapidly rising prices then created a loan feedback loop which over a period of years expanded the loan supply past the maximum limit that could be supported by the economy.
If there had been a limit on the supply of loans however, as the theoretical model of the fractional reserve banking system implies, such positive feedback loops would be naturally damped by the operation of supply and demand on the loans themselves. As demand for a restricted supply of loans increased, the interest rates for loans would also increase, acting to restrict demand for loans, and the eventual impact of the bubble. That this did not occur provides additional evidence for a failure somewhere within the fractional reserve regulation process.
Absent any limit on the supply of loans, the only other regulator is the demand for loans. This has implications, both at the end of a credit bubble, when banks, now fully dependent on loan profits run out of qualified borrowers, but also in its aftermath, where cultural norms have changed to the point where no solvent person is prepared to borrow. This may help to explain both the psychological and generational effects that have been frequently commented on as possible causes for the recurring bubble phenomena. The preconditions for a truly catastrophic bubble, appear to be both a failure in loan regulation on the supply side, and a failure in personal financial regulation on the demand side. Consequently local variations in both regulation and behaviour of supply and demand for loans can effect the eventual outcome.
The sale of asset backed securities creates 9 , from the limited perspective of individual banks a financial instrument of pure profit. For the banks, loan sales are to a large extent risk free. All that is necessary is that the borrower remains solvent for long enough for the loan to be packaged and sold on. The banks profit both from the fees associated with issuing the loan, and the profit on the sale of the subsequent asset backed securities. 10 Owing to the generation of money within the fractional reserve system as a result of the loans, and the interaction of the financial instruments they are packaged in with the reserve system, there is now no limit, systemic or regulatory, on the quantity of loans that can be generated within the banking system. The secondary implications for the money and loan supplies as these instruments have gradually infiltrated the rest of the financial system appear to have been completely missed, although their extraordinary growth was noted [10] .
Inevitably as the supply of loans increased, the quality of borrowers deteriorated, and as the practice of selling loans spread internationally, the conditions were laid for the current global crisis. At the same time, sophisticated repackaging of the loans, created financial instruments that could be purchased by Money Market Funds, Pension Funds, and included in bank reserves, which acted to both increase demand for the instruments and effectively hollow out the entire financial system in the process.
In their interaction with the rest of the financial system, the securities have essentially created two money supplies, one regulated by commercial bank deposits at the federal bank, and one that was regulated solely by the reserve requirements of the individual banks. Unfortunately, the virtual representation of the electronic system makes the two indistinguishable from each other. Since the banks are allowed to hold a small part of their reserves in asset backed securities, a leak has opened up between loans and reserves, that provides a plausible explanation for the uncontrolled expansion of M2 and M3 that can be seen in Figure 4(a) . As a result, and over decade long periods, considerable asset inflation and consequent misallocation of resources has occurred in the prices of goods that could either be financed by loans, or purchased with the proceeds from loan financed sales. It seems quite possible that this process is also indirectly responsible for many of the notable wealth inequalities that have built up in the last two decades in many economies, as those with favourable access to borrowing facilities were able to generate disproportionate profits.
The end result of this process is, as of writing, a large surplus of electronically represented money and financial instruments of systemically dubious paternity. Its' sheer size, and concentration within the financial sector, has fortunately created a flow problem for its holders when they try to convert it into more useful investments. Since it has been far easier for the electronic system, to generate money within the electronic system, the majority of this 'money' is still trapped there. However, some of it has been used to finance real estate activities, generating a large surplus of housing and commercial real estate construction. It has also backed considerable amounts of leveraged private equity buyouts, the resulting debt of which is now causing significant problems to formally profitable companies. An unfortunate side effect of initiatives like the TARP fund in the USA is to provide a channel for the loan generated money supply to move into the general money supply more readily.
It is this overhang of virtual money, and the real world effects it can have as it is transferred around the financial and currency markets by the individuals and organisations that control it, that presents one of the critical long term problems presented by the current crisis. Even if the two problems in this paper could be corrected without destroying most existing financial entities, which is unlikely, there is still the problem of the duration of the debts themselves, and the associated overhang of virtual money. In a market based, free exchange system, these problems should correct themselves over time, but this may take decades, and the associated gyrations of the currency markets are unlikely to be constructive.
The conundrum can be best understood in conjunction with the future of the existing financial industry. A recovery from the bad debt that is currently going into default for those companies actively involved in the asset backed security exploit, requires considerable profitability. Even a return to the extremely high profit levels of the early 2000's would probably still require a decade or more to repair the damage. These 'profits' were for the most part a by-product of the feedback loop, the output of unregulated money and loan creation. Consequently fixing the problems in loan regulation, would ensure that most of the current financial industry could never recover, since it would never be able to generate such abnormal profits again.
To be specific, it can never recover enough of the money currently represented in deposit and savings accounts, which has been lent out against poor collateral to borrowers who cannot repay it. Nor are the various central account insurance schemes adequate to the losses. In fact, any solutions that revolve around taxpayer recapitalisation of the banks, have to deal with the problem that the government is on the left hand side of the leverage equation, and consequently operating at a considerable disadvantage to today's leverage ratios. Whatever balance between prices, values, and the quantity of money and loans that the distributed market economy in fact supports will readjust over time. But this readjustment will have to reflect the removal of substantial quantities of loaned money, which in effect requires an equal and opposite removal of deposited funds from banks within the systems.
Then there is the problem of the H.8 anomaly in the relationships between deposits and loans currently in the system. This is perhaps the clearest indication that something has gone extremely wrong, within the core monetary system. Without access to detailed statistics from the 1930's depression it is hard to be certain, but it seems possible that this aspect of the crisis is entirely unique to the current day, which may also be of some concern.
It is in the light of this paper, an open question as to how the economy would in fact behave, if the fractional reserve system were implemented as it is described in economic textbooks. Economic historians may be able to identify periods and countries where this has occurred for further study, but it is entirely possible that even if they exist, foreign exchange flows from countries where this was not the case, would have distorted the system's behaviour. This further complicates attempts to identify practical solutions, and simulation and study of the dynamic behaviour of fractional reserve banking is clearly a topic for urgent research. 11 Experience with similar bugs in real time communication networks, suggests that it may be possible to develop solutions that could back out the worst effects of these problems. Realistically though, the economic situation will have to considerably worsen, and our understanding of the systemic behaviours of the fractional reserve banking system improve, before any such practical solution could become politically acceptable.
It would nonetheless, probably be wise to begin by forbidding any and all forms of loan transfer or sale from inside of the regulated banking system, to outside of it.
